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What Is Happening out There? 
The Representation of Perception in Daniel Defoe’s Fictional Autobiographies* 
Eri SHIGEMATSU 
0. Introduction 
Many literary critics have explored consciousness representation as an important literary 
practice in the novel. According to the narratologist Franz Stanzel, for example, 
representation of consciousness is “especially prominent in the novel”, although it has 
been involved in all literary genres (1984: 126-127). David Lodge, who is a literary critic 
as well as a novelist, regards literature as “the richest and most comprehensive” “record 
of human consciousness” (2002: 10), and says that the novel in particular can “[capture] 
the dense specificity of personal experience” (2002: 14). This characteristic of the novel 
is applied to the early novels in the eighteenth century, as Joe Bray clearly states that 
“From its beginnings, the novel has been associated with some kind of an attempt to 
render individual psychology, to delve into the minds of its characters” (2003: 1, my 
italics). This paper examines how consciousness is represented in the pioneering novels 
of Daniel Defoe. 
Free indirect style has been of particular importance to the interpretation of fictional 
consciousness. Although this style does not seem to have come to its “final ripening” 
(Bakhtin 1984: 36) in the early eighteenth century, Defoe represents the consciousness of 
his characters by using varying free indirect modes in his first-person autobiographical 
narratives. Contrary to Monika Fludernik’s (1996: 171) claim that Defoe’s free indirect 
style “only represents utterances” (i.e. free indirect speech), I have pointed out in my 
articles that Defoe uses free indirect thought to represent the consciousness of his 
characters (Shigematsu 2015; 2016a). Defoe’s narrative techniques for representing 
consciousness are not limited to the use of free indirect speech and thought, however. 
What should not be disregarded in the analyses of fictional consciousness is, in Shigeyuki 
Kuroda’s words, “the problem of levels of consciousness” (1976: 123). Ann Banfield 
argues that “sentences representing consciousness” include sentences which represent not 
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only “thought” but also “sense perceptions” (1981: 65). I call the inward consciousness 
such as thought and belief the conceptual level of consciousness, and the outward 
consciousness like sensory perception the perceptual level of consciousness. With due 
attention to the relatively unexplored perceptual level of consciousness, this paper 
suggests that there is another important narrative technique for representing fictional 
consciousness in Defoe’s first-person narratives. Termed narrated perception, this 
technique renders a character’s sensory perceptions of the external world as if they were 
directly experienced by that character. Narrated perception has received specific attention 
from some critics as having characteristic features in formal, functional and semantic 
terms, and in general, it is examined in the third-person narrative context (Brinton 1980; 
Fehr 1938; Fludernik 1993; Pallarés-García 2012).  
As a case study, this paper focuses on some scenes in which the internal and external 
worlds of a character are blended in Defoe’s first-person autobiographical narratives. It 
will demonstrate that “I” as a narrator (the narrating self) can relive his or her past 
experiences by representing not only conceptual but also perceptual levels of 
consciousness of “I” as a character (the experiencing self), and that this in turn enhances 
the effect of what Stanzel (1984) calls “the illusion of immediacy” in the mind of the 
reader. Section 1 demonstrates the ways in which point of view shifts in first-person 
autobiographical narratives. Section 2 explores the narrative techniques for representing 
consciousness when the narrating self psychologically identifies with the experiencing 
self, focusing on the different levels (perceptual and conceptual) of consciousness. 
Section 3 illustrates the effect of using narrated perception and other related techniques 
in representing the consciousness of the experiencing self. Finally, the concluding section 
suggests that the representation of immediate perceptions of the experiencing self may be 
more significant for the narrating self’s reliving of its past experiences than that of 
immediate thoughts. 
1. Shift in point of view in first-person autobiographical narratives 
1.1. Narrative distance between the two selves 
In first-person autobiographical narratives, narrator and character (hero/heroine) are the 
same person and they are conventionally referred to by the same pronoun “I”. These two 
I’s, that is, “I” as narrator and “I” as character, are termed “the narrating self” and “the 
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experiencing self” respectively in narratology.1 Although these two selves are the same 
person, they are different phases of the self and thus do not share the same place, time 
and knowledge (Galbraith 1994: 125). In this sense, as Cohn argues, “a first-person 
narrator’s relationship to [his/her] past self parallels a narrator’s relationship to [his/her] 
protagonist in a third person novel” (1978: 143). The first-person and third-person 
narrative styles, however, are crucially different from each other in terms of the 
ontological relationship between narrator and character. In the case of third-person 
narratives, a narrator is “absent from the story [he/she] tells”, that is, he/she is 
ontologically outside the storyworld, whereas a narrator is always “present as a character 
in the story [he/she] tells” in first-person narratives (Genette 1980: 243-245).2 Therefore, 
the relationship between the narrating self and the experiencing self “imitates the 
temporal continuity of real beings, an existential relationship that differs substantially 
from the purely functional relationship that binds a narrator to [his/her] protagonist in 
third-person fiction” (Cohn 1978: 144). 
Point of view usually shifts gradually in narratives. In first-person autobiographical 
narratives, point of view shifts between the narrating self and the experiencing self. As 
Stanzel points out, this shift in point of view between the two selves is “very important 
for the dynamics of the narrative in the first-person novel” (1984: 72). The shift in point 
of view is perceived from the change in narrative distance. Narrative distance includes 
psychological distance as well as spatio-temporal distance between the two selves. When 
the narrating self gradually enters into the consciousness of the experiencing self, the 
narrative distance between the two selves is diminished, and this process is reflected in 
the mode of consciousness representation, which will be discussed in terms of what 
Chantelle Warner calls “our natural REMEMBERING schema” (2009: 16) in the 
following section. 
1.2. REMEMBERING schemas: RECOUNTING and RELIVING 
Retrospection is essential in autobiographical narratives. The better-informed narrating 
self remembers its past experiences in order to tell a story. According to Warner (2009), 
                                                   
1 See, for example, Cohn (1978), Fludernik (2009), Galbraith (1994) and Stanzel (1984). 
2 In Genette’s terminology, therefore, a third-person narrative is called “heterodiegetic” and a 
first-person narrative “homodiegetic” (1980: 244-245). A first-person autobiographical 
narrative, in which a narrator and a hero/heroine of the story are the same person, is termed 
“autodiegetic” (1980: 245).  
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our natural story-telling schema of REMEMBERING can be divided into two distinctive 
types. When the narrating self detaches itself from the experiencing self and describes the 
past experiences with its language, the presence of the narrating self is foregrounded and 
the consciousness of the experiencing self is reported through the language of the 
narrating self. In other words, the narrating self recounts what it remembers from its own 
perspective. Warner calls this schema “REMEMBERING AS RECOUNTING” (2009: 
17). On the other hand, when the narrating self gradually enters into the consciousness of 
the experiencing self, and psychologically identifies with the experiencing self, the 
presence of the narrating self is backgrounded and the representation of past 
consciousness is filtered through the experiencing self. In Warner’s terminology, this 
schema is called “REMEMBERING AS RELIVING” (2009: 17), in which the narrating 
self relives the experiences it remembers through the consciousness of the experiencing 
self.  
In RECOUNTING, the narrative distance between the two selves is widened and 
consciousness is represented indirectly or mediately through the point of view of the 
narrating self, whereas in RELIVING, the distance is shortened and consciousness is 
directly or immediately represented through the point of view of the experiencing self. 
The shift in point of view between the two selves parallels the transition in the 
REMEMBERING schema, narrative distance and mode of consciousness representation 
as Figure 1 shows: 
Point of view the narrating self the experiencing self 
REMEMBERING schema RECOUNTING RELIVING 
Narrative distance dissociation identification 
Mode of consciousness representation indirect (mediate) direct (immediate) 
Figure 1.  Shift in point of view in first-person narratives3 
As mentioned earlier, shift in point of view is always gradual, and there are various 
transitional phases between RECOUNTING and RELIVING. The following sections 
focus on the transitional phases from RECOUNTING to RELIVING, and examine the 
ways in which this transition happens when the narrating self gradually enters into the 
consciousness of the experiencing self. 
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2. RELIVING and representation of consciousness 
2.1. Illusion of immediacy 
What happens when the narrating self gradually enters into the consciousness of the 
experiencing self, or when the story-telling schema changes from RECOUNTING to 
RELIVING? When gradually identifying with the experiencing self, the narrating self re-
experiences the past events. This reliving of experiences evokes psychological attachment 
to the past self on the part of the narrating self. What is important during this process is 
that the reader also feels as if he/she directly looks into the consciousness of the 
experiencing self and pseudo-experiences the events in the storyworld. Stanzel (1984) 
calls this effect “the illusion of immediacy”. The reader does not feel the presence of the 
narrating self, and the sense of mediacy – that is, the presence of the narrator as mediator 
– is suspended when the narrating self is reliving its past experiences. In other words, the 
narrating self’s reliving of experiences can be perceived by the reader through the illusion 
of immediacy (Nakao 2016: 3-4). 
2.2. Levels of consciousness: free indirect thought and narrated perception 
The narrative technique which has been considered of great importance in creating the 
illusion of immediacy is free indirect thought (FIT). FIT is used to represent thoughts of 
the experiencing self which may be on the “threshold of verbalization” (Cohn 1978: 103). 
Although many critics have pointed out that FIT can be found in first-person narratives, 
FIT tends to be examined in the third-person narrative context. FIT is generally 
considered to be a mixture of indirect thought (example (1), the original sentence from 
Robinson Crusoe) and direct thought (example (2), my adapted version of (1)). In FIT, 
person and tense are typically selected from the point of view of the narrating self as in 
indirect thought, but the expressive language of the experiencing self remains as in direct 
thought (example (3), my adapted version of (1)). 
(1) I consider’d also that I could by no Means tell for certain where I had trod, and 
where I had not; (Robinson Crusoe: 134) 
(2) I thought, “I can’t possibly tell for sure where I walked, and where I didn’t!” 
(3) I couldn’t possibly tell for sure where I had walked, and where I had not! 
When it comes to content of consciousness, however, the narrating self can represent 
at least two levels of consciousness. On the one hand, the narrating self can represent 
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internal thoughts and beliefs which are formed in the mind of the experiencing self. On 
the other hand, the narrating self can also represent sense perceptions of the external 
world which the experiencing self undergoes. It is not possible to clearly demarcate these 
two levels of consciousness, because their relationship is continuous and there are some 
overlapping areas between perception and conception.4 In the reliving of experiences, 
therefore, the narrating self uses not only FIT, but also a narrative technique called 
“narrated perception” 5  to represent sense perceptions as if they were immediately 
perceived by the experiencing self. As pointed out by Brinton, these two techniques are 
the “complementary parts of one coherent style” (1980: 363) used to represent the 
immediate consciousness of the experiencing self in a text. 
Due to the formal similarities between FIT and narrated perception, some critics who 
do not delve into “the range and depth of a character’s consciousness” (Brinton 1980: 
364) tend to confuse narrated perception with FIT or examine narrated perception as a 
mere aspect of FIT.6 Following other critics, however, I will give particular attention to 
narrated perception as having distinctive features in formal, functional and semantic 
terms.7 Formally, narrated perception and FIT share some features such as the subjective 
use of the past progressive, proximal deictics and evaluative and epistemic expressions, 
but unlike FIT, parentheticals, questions and exclamations are rare in narrated perception 
(Brinton 1980; Pallarés-García 2012). In terms of narrative function, narrated perception 
can represent a character’s immediate consciousness and at the same time describe events 
in the external world, whereas FIT can only represent the consciousness of characters 
(Pallarés-García 2012: 175). Semantically, as Pallarés-García (2012: 175) explains, 
narrated perception captures what Chafe (1994: 32, 195-211) calls “extroverted 
                                                   
4  See Yoro (2005: 120-123) and Fludernik (2009: 82-83). Fludernik argues that there is a need 
for “an alternative sliding scale” which is different from “the formal scale from narratorial 
language to characters’ internal discourse” of thought representation when considering the 
content of consciousness, because these two sliding scales do not completely agree with each 
other (2009: 82-83). 
5  It has also been called “substitutionary perception” (Fher 1938; Hernadi 1972; McHale 1978), 
“represented perception” (Banfield 1982; Brinton 1980; Rundquist 2014), or “free indirect 
perception” (Chatman 1978; Palmer 2004; Schmid 2010). Following other critics (Cohn 1978; 
Fludernik 1993; Pallarés-García 2012), I use the term “narrated perception” in this paper, 
because, as Pallarés-García (2012: 184) argues, it implies the close relationship between 
narration and perception, which is what makes narrated perception different from FIT. 
6  See, for example, Chatman (1978), Ikeo (2007), Leech & Short (2007 [1981]), McHale (1978), 
Pascal (1977), and Semino & Short (2004). 
7  See, for example, Brinton (1980), Fehr (1938), Fludernik (1993), and Pallarés-García (2012). 
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consciousness” or “immediate” conscious experiences, and on the other hand, FIT can 
also portray “introverted consciousness” or “displaced” conscious experiences. In other 
words, narrated perception is a narrative technique which “essentially portrays what is 
happening in the immediate environment of a character, as well as his/her awareness of 
ongoing bodily sensations and mental states” (Pallarés-García 2012: 175). FIT in contrast 
can “represent a wider range of cognitive processes, not necessarily stemming from the 
character’s direct sensory experience of his/her physical reality” (Pallarés-García 2012: 
175). Although they have these formal, functional and semantic differences, both narrated 
perception and FIT are important narrative techniques for representing consciousness in 
the process of the narrating self’s reliving of experiences. As with the conceptual level of 
consciousness (principally thought representation), the perceptual level of consciousness 
can be represented in various ways according to the narrative distance between the two 
selves: 
(4) … when I came nearer to him, I saw something hanging over his Shoulders …  
(Robinson Crusoe: 24) 
(5) I come nearer to him. Something is hanging over his shoulders.  
(6) I came nearer to him. Something was hanging over his shoulders. 
Perception can be reported from the point of view of the narrating self as in (4). Perception 
is by nature non-verbal, so direct replication of perception in the form of direct discourse 
such as direct thought is not plausible (Fehr 1938: 102). However, the so-called dramatic 
present as in my adapted sentence (5), for example, can be explained in terms of the 
reliving of past experiences through the immediate perception of the experiencing self. 
Narrated perception is usually introduced by narration or report of a preceding 
perception, which is called a “perception indicator” or “window opener” (Fehr 1938: 98-
99). In my adapted sentence (6), “I came nearer to him” is a perception indicator, and it 
implies that the following sentence, “something was hanging over his shoulders”, 
represents the immediate perception of the experiencing self. The use of the past 
progressive (“was hanging”) in this sentence signifies ongoing perceptions of the 
experiencing self, so it is one of the most important linguistic markers of narrated 
perception. The next section looks into other linguistic markers of narrated perception 
and their effects in Defoe’s narratives. 
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3. Narrated perception in Defoe’s narratives 
This section looks closely into narrated perception in Defoe’s narratives. Even Monika 
Fludernik (1996), who goes back to the medieval period to explore the use of free indirect 
style, states that Defoe’s free indirect style is limited to the rendering of utterances: 
Not only are these novels [novels of Godwin, Brown and Richardson] important in 
the history of free indirect discourse, providing the first instances of FID for the 
representation of consciousness in a first-person context (Behn’s examples of FID 
are all in third-person passages, and Defoe’s first-person FID only represents 
utterances); they also initiate a development of poetic sensibility in the history of the 
novel which attains its appropriate perfection in Austen and Scott.  
(Fludernik 1996: 171) 
However, as Mikhail Bakhtin suggests, new narrative techniques “prepare themselves 
slowly, over centuries” and “a given epoch can do more than create optimal conditions 
for the final ripening and realization of a new form” (1984: 36). Contrary to Fludernik’s 
claim, FIT is used to represent consciousness in Defoe’s narratives, and so is narrated 
perception, although they are not always indicated by clear linguistic markers as in the 
novels in the later periods. In the following analyses, I will investigate the pioneering use 
of narrated perception in Defoe’s narratives, and demonstrate that representation of 
immediate perceptions also contributes to creating the illusion of immediacy in the mind 
of the reader. 
The following example is from Moll Flanders, in which Moll’s first adventure as a 
thief is described. The narrating self blames her wrongdoing on the Devil, because she 
was not conscious of what she was doing back then. But the ways in which the 
experiencing self reacts to the bait which the Devil laid, or in other words, her conscious 
perceptions, are represented in the passage in detail: 
(7) I am very sure I had no manner of Design in my Head, when I went out, I neither 
knew or considered where to go, or on what Business; but as the Devil carried 
me out and laid his Bait for me, so he brought me to be sure to the place, for I 
knew not whither I was going or what I did. 
Wandering thus about I knew not whither, I pass’d by an Apothecary’s Shop in 
Leadenhall-street, where I saw lye on a Stool just before the Counter a little 
Bundle wrapt in a white Cloth; beyond it, stood a Maid Servant with her Back to 
it, looking up towards the top of the Shop, where the Apothecary’s Apprentice, 
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as I suppose, was standing up on the Counter, with his Back also to the Door, and 
a Candle in his Hand, looking and reaching up to the upper Shelf for something 
he wanted, so that both were engag’d mighty earnestly, and no Body else was in 
the Shop. (Moll Flanders: 160) 
The participle construction in the second paragraph includes the word “thus”, which 
implies that the narrating self still emphasizes that she was induced to steal. The present 
participle “wandering” implies that the younger Moll is walking without any purpose, 
without knowing where she is going. However, in the following main clause, the 
experiencing self’s apparent perceptions of her whereabouts are indicated. Her action “I 
passed by” means that the experiencing self sees the shop and recognizes that she is 
passing by it. She perceives, probably visually, what kind of shop it is and which street it 
is located in (“an Apothecary’s Shop in Leadenhall-street”). In the next relative clause, 
her visual perception is explicitly reported with the perception verb “saw”. This clause 
functions as perception indicator, and thus the following clauses are likely to be narrated 
perception rather than pure narration.  
The preposition “beyond” clearly represents the visual perception of the experiencing 
self. It indicates that she moves her eyes from the bundle to the maid. The word order is 
inverted in the clause beginning with “beyond”. According to Fludernik, “the order of 
perception may be mirrored iconically by the word order” (1993: 305). Here, the younger 
Moll moves her eyes from the bundle, sees someone standing, recognizes that it is a maid 
servant, that the bundle is behind her, and that she is looking up, and so forth. The word 
“something” signifies the experiencing self’s inability to name what she is seeing 
(Fludernik 1993: 306). The use of the past progressive and epistemic words, such as 
“mighty earnestly”, also indicates the ongoing or evaluative perceptions of the 
experiencing self. They all convey a sense of subjective consciousness of the past self.8 
Such a passage that represents immediate perceptions has the effect of undermining 
the narrating self’s claim that the past self was not aware of the circumstances of the theft. 
The vivid representations of immediate perceptions of the experiencing self evoke 
RELIVING schema and imply that the narrating self is entering into the past 
consciousness and reliving her sensory experiences as they were experienced before. The 
reader thus also feels as if he/she were looking at the bundle as perceived by Moll in the 
                                                   
8 See Shigematsu (2016b: 28-29) for more detailed explanation of this passage regarding the 
function of narrated perception. 
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storyworld.9 
The following passage from Robinson Crusoe shows the effective use of mediate 
perceptions (report of perception) and immediate perceptions (narrated perception) of the 
experiencing self. Put differently, the narrating self effectively switches the 
REMEMBERING schemas between RECOUNTING and RELIVING. Crusoe is 
observing the cruel ritual of the savages from a place where he cannot be found by them: 
(8) … here [the Top of the Hill] I ovserv’d by the help of my Perspective Glass, that 
they were no less than Thirty in Number, that they had a Fire kindled, that they 
had had Meat dress’d. How they had cook’d it, that I knew not, or what it was; 
but they were all Dancing in I know not how many barbarous Gestures and 
Figures, their own Way, round the Fire. 
  While I was thus looking on them, I perceived by my Perspective, two 
miserable Wretches dragg’d from the Boats, where it seems they were laid by, 
and were now brought out for the Slaughter. I perceived one of them immediately 
fell, being knock’d down, I suppose with a Club or Wooden Sword, for that was 
their way, and two or three others were at work immediately cutting him open for 
their Cookery, while the other Victim was left standing by himself, till they should 
be ready for him. In that very Moment, this poor Wretch seeing himself a little at 
Liberty, Nature inspir’d him with Hopes of Life, and he started away from them, 
and ran with incredible Swiftness along the Sands directly towards me, I mean 
towards that part of the Coast, where my Habitation was. (Robinson Crusoe: 170) 
In the first paragraph in (8), it is explicitly reported that the younger Crusoe is observing 
what the savages do (“here I ovserv’d by the help of my Perspective Glass, that they were 
no less than Thirty in Number, …”). Note, however that the place where he hides is 
referred to as “here” at the beginning of the paragraph. It reflects the point of view of the 
experiencing self, and implies that the narrating self is gradually entering into the 
consciousness of the experiencing self. The report of perception and the use of the 
proximal deictic “here” indicate that the next sentence represents the ongoing perceptions 
of the experiencing self. In the next sentence, what he could not see is topicalized to stress 
his inability to see and understand everything (“How they had cook’d it, that I knew not”), 
                                                   
9  Note, however, that the narrating self appears in the passage in the parenthetical clause “as I 
suppose”. The reliving of experiences or the illusion of immediacy seems to be temporarily 
suspended by the use of this parenthetical, but in terms of RELIVING schema of first-person 
autobiographical narratives, this existential relationship or the temporal continuity between the 
two selves shown by the use of the present tense is important to make the narrating self’s 
reliving more plausible and natural. See the related explanations in the analyses below, in which 
I suggest the effect of the use of the present tense in (8) and (9). 
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and his ongoing perception is represented through the past progressive (“they were all 
Dancing”). When mentioning his inability to understand the second time, the narrating 
self uses the present tense “know”, which reflects the fact that the older Crusoe still cannot 
understand the ways in which the savages danced. It is the privileged ability of the 
narrating self to freely “slide up and down the time axis that connects [his/her] two selves” 
as the relationship between the two selves imitates the continuity of a real being (Cohn 
1978: 145). The temporal shift is thus regarded as “one of the most common deictic shifts” 
in first-person autobiographical narratives (Warner 2009: 15): the narrating self can 
naturally move between the present and the past when telling a story. In other words, as 
the REMEMBERING schema evokes “seemingly unmediated access to past experiences”, 
“the use of the present tense” is generally perceived as “natural” in autobiographical 
narratives (Warner 2009: 16). It is this natural existential relationship and internal tension 
between the two selves that make the reliving of experiences possible in the 
autobiographical narrative style. 
In the first sentence in the second paragraph, the perceptions of the experiencing self 
are again reported from the point of view of the narrating self, but at the same time, the 
point of view of the experiencing self is mingled with it, which is indicated by the use of 
the past progressive (“While I was thus looking on them”) and the proximal deictic “now” 
(“[they] were now brought out for the Slaughter”). The narrating self uses the epistemic 
verb “seem” in the present tense (“where it seems they were laid by”). This haziness of 
memory on the part of the narrating self indicates that he is entering more deeply into the 
past memory. In the following sentence, the narrating self continues to report his past 
perceptions, and as in the previous report, the point of view of the experiencing self is 
reflected in the use of the -ing form (“being knock’d down”). The phrase “two or three” 
also reflects the haziness of past perceptions. The parenthetical clause, “I suppose with a 
Club or Wooden Sword”, is expressed in the present tense, and thus represents the 
consciousness which is continually in the mind of the older self. In the last sentence, the 
prepositional phrase “in that very moment” functions as perception indicator, and the 
subsequent main clause represents the immediate perceptions of the experiencing self, 
which is indicated by the use of deictic or evaluative words, such as “this poor” and 
“incredible”. The prepositional phrase “towards me” also reflects the deictic centre of the 
experiencing self, because the narrating self rephrases it to make it clear which direction 
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the poor wretch is moving in (“I mean towards that part of the Coast, where my Habitation 
was”). The clause, “Nature inspir’d him with Hopes of Life”, is a representation of 
thought, which is inserted in narrated perception. This simultaneous representation of 
perceptual and conceptual levels of consciousness promotes the effect of the reliving of 
experiences and the illusion of immediacy. 
In the following passage from Roxana, the immediate perceptions of the experiencing 
self lead to her thought. After she parted with the French Prince, Roxana decided to sell 
the jewels which her late husband left for her to a jeweler through a Dutch merchant. As 
she refers to it as “my Folly” (112), this attempt puts her into considerable fright: 
(9) As soon as the Jew saw the Jewels, he falls a jabbering in Dutch, or Portuguese, 
to the Merchant, and I cou’d presently perceive that they were in some great 
Surprize, both of them; the Jew held up his Hands, look’d at me with some 
Horrour, then talk’d Dutch again, and put himself into a thousand Shapes, 
twisting his Body, and wringing up his Face this Way, and that Way, in his 
Discourse; stamping with his Feet, and throwing abroad his Hands, as if he was 
not in a Rage only, but in a meer Fury; then he wou’d turn, and give a Look at 
me, like the Devil; I thought I never saw any thing so frightful in my Life. 
(Roxana: 112-113) 
In the first sentence, the perceptions of the experiencing self are reported (“As soon as 
the Jew saw the Jewels” and “I cou’d presently perceive that …”). Though they are a 
report of perception, the point of view of the past self is mingled with it. For example, the 
use of the present tense “falls”, rather than the past tense “fell”, implies a vivid 
recollection of the Jew’s action on the part of the experiencing self. The expression 
“Dutch, or Portuguese” represents the experiencing self’s unclear recognition of the 
language spoken at this moment. The use of epistemic “some” and the extraposed “both 
of them” also reflect the consciousness of the past self. These reports of perception 
function as perception indicators, and thus the subsequent clauses represent the 
immediate consciousness of the experiencing self. She can clearly recognize what 
language the Jew speaks now (“then talk’d Dutch again”). The repetition of the -ing form 
(“twisting”, “wringing”, “stamping”, and “throwing”) has a similar effect of representing 
ongoing perceptions to the past progressive. Similes with “as if” and “like”, according to 
Brinton (1980: 377), are also markers of reflective perceptions. These linguistic markers 
embody the auditory and visual fright of the experiencing self. 
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In the last sentence, perceptions of the experiencing self lead to her thought, which is 
introduced by the reporting clause, “I thought”. It may look like indirect thought, but the 
past tense “saw” is not back-shifted, so the reported clause is represented from the deictic 
centre of the experiencing self, that is, this is the immediate thought of the experiencing 
self. The reporting clause (“I thought”) not only indicates that the representation shifts to 
the conceptual level, but also that the presence of the narrating self becomes less 
backgrounded, which indicates that the narrating self is existentially related to the 
experiencing self. The use of a reporting clause might create the appearance that the 
narrating self interferes with the reliving of experiences, but it actually helps to signify 
the internal tension between the two selves. This is what makes first-person narratives 
different from third-person narratives. The existential continuity between the two selves 
is one of the important conditions of RELIVING. 
4. Summary 
As the analyses have shown, the reliving of experiences and the illusion of immediacy 
are achieved by representing immediate perceptions as well as immediate thoughts of the 
experiencing self. Although it had not fully matured in the early-eighteenth century, the 
pioneering use of narrated perception is one of the important narrative techniques for 
representing immediate consciousness of the experiencing self in Defoe’s first-person 
autobiographical narratives. It is also possible to suggest that the use of narrated 
perception has more significant semantic effect on RELIVING than FIT does, because 
with the representation of immediate perceptions, the reader can virtually experience what 
the character actually experienced not only through his/her mind but also through his/her 
bodily senses. As for the representation of perception in the novel, more investigation 
into other modes (e.g. report of perception) than narrated perception is required to deepen 
the understanding of the fictional consciousness. 
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